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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
MARJORIE BROWN, 
JOYCE BROWN and 
LINDA MAE BROWN 
J\linors, by and through 
their Guardian Ad Litem, 
HERBERT BROW.N, .TR., 
- vs -
ALAN D. FRANDSEN, 
Administrator of the 
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A ppellan ts, 
!~state of NATHAN BRE.WER, 
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Respondent. 
RESPONDE~'P'S BRIEF 
NA'rVRE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10687 
This is an aetion for damages for personal injuries, 
~ustained hy guests in a singlt> car upset, against the 
Pstah• of tlw host driver who was killed in the same 
arrident. 
DISPOSITIO~ IN LOW"ER corR:T 
The plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment 
awarded defendant hy Distriet .Tudgti A. H. Ell<"tt .Tune 
1:). 1966. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTR 
Respondent agrf'ces the facts are as set forth in the 
Findings of Fact entered hy the trial eourt and printed 
in appellants' brief. 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS FAILED TO EST AB-
LISH "WILLFUL MISCONDUCT" OF THE HOST 
DRIVER, AND THE TRIAL COURT THEREFORE 
CORRECTLY RULED THAT RECOVERY IS BARRED 
UNDER UTAH'S "GUEST STATUTE," TITLE 41-9-1, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Appellants do not here challenge the finding in the 
lower court that they were guests, nor do tlwy contt>nd 
there is any evidence which affirmatively establishrs 
that the host driver knew that he was slPPpy or contimwd 
to drivP, despitP prior "Tarnings of irnpt>ncling slet>p. 
Instead, appellants' entire cast> is hottonwd upon 
the proposition that to go to slPPp whil<-> driving is to hr 
guilty of willful misconduct. This Court iP. askt><l to rPach 
this remarkable conclusion in thP face of the great mass 
of casp law which rPquirPs affirmatin' p1JidP11ce that tlH' 
driver had prior warning of approaehing sleepiness be-
fore a jury will be allow Pd to inf er willful misconduct 
from the merp fact that thP driver fell asleep at the \Yheel. 
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Since there is no such affirmative evidence in this 
rase, appellants urge this Court to supply the vital mis-
sing element by judicially noticing that a warning always 
occurs before sleep overtakes a driver. Appellants' sug-
w·stion conflicts with the tPstimony of one of their two 
medical Pxperts, Dr. Rufus .J. \Valker, and with other 
Pvidc>nce in the case. 
F'urthem10rP, in ordt>r to aceept appellants' argu-
nwnt, this Court would have to rejert the unanimous 
holdings in a large body of rm;p law on the subject and 
ovPrrule ih; O\\'n derisiom; ronstrning the term "\\·illfnl 
misconduct" as usud in tlw l'tah Guc>st Statute. 
Although sleep is usuall~· precc>ded hy a gradual 
loss of consciousness, surh loss of consciousness does not 
ahYays constitnt1· a "·a ming; tlwre must he> a momen-
tary regaining of consciousrn•:,;;s in order for a driver to 
rPalize that sleep is approaching. Tlw appellants' ex1wrt 
\\'itness, Dr. Rufus .J am<>s \Valk Pr, trstified that :-;lt>rp 
oftPn c·omPs withont warning: 
"Q. ~ow, >·ou fpp} tlw fart that tlw road was 
strajght and lPvPl, hrn lanps in width in this 
arPa, would that have an>· significanrp to this 
rase? 
A. I beliPVP it has so.nw signifiranre. 
Q. What significanee do you ft>Pl that this hmd 
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A. If the road is straight and narrow, it has a 
tendency to hypnotize some drivers, and long 
distances have been known to put people to 
sleep .. 
What I mean by hypnotize in terms of a 
straight, long, level road is that your atten-
tion gets fixed on this, you tend to becomc> 
driving almost automatically without any 
pffort and your rpflexes and senses could 
just sort of diminish; and in this manner you 
could go to slPep driving. 
Q. You mean this would be a gradual process 
of relaxing and letting go~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. This type of hypnosis, as you are using it 
here, would be something that would just 
come on gradually, then? 
A. Yes, in my opinion. 
Q. And a person that was being so affected prob-
ably would not be aware that this was hap-
pening to him~ 
A. That's right. 
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Q. 1'he condition of sleep induced by what is 
commonly known as road hypnosis or highway 
hypnosis, is that something that comes on 
gradually. Doctor? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does tlw individual haw some fore"·arning 
of that condition? 
A. Not in my expNiencP " 
( Drposition of Dr. \YalkPr, pp. 2-1--'.25, :28, puhlislwd 
at the hParing on tlw :'.\lotion for St1111mar>· .Tndg-
11wn t.) 
If the driver m the instant cast> nP\Pr ht>camP cog-
ni11ant of his gradual los:;; of consciousness, it follows that 
lw "·as nevPr "·arnP<l of approaching sleep. Absent such 
a warning, thP drivPr 1rnulcl not lw guilt>• of willful rnis-
('Onduct because lw would nPvPr havP had thP chancP to 
PxereisP his will. An exPreise of the will with knowledge 
that thP conduct is wrongful iR an essPntial prerequisite 
to a finding of \\·illful misconduct in TTtah. In tlw n'cent 
ras<' of llf11lli9rrn r. Harwood, 11 Utah :2d 7-1-, ~)55 P.:2<1 G:2, 
(i:3 ( 19GO), tlw Court stafrd: 
"Willful misconduct is the intentional doing 
of an art or inte11ti01rnl omitting or failing to do 
an act, with knmdedg<' that sPrions injury is prob-
able and not lllPrely a possihle n·~mlt, or t11e in-
te11fimrnl doing of an act with \\·anton aml rerkless 
clisn'gard of the pnss;JiJ,. eon:'w<pwnr<'s.'' (Empha-
sis snppli<>d.) 
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To the same effect are earlier Utah decisions of 
Ricc1di 1i. Robinson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 P. 2d 282 (1954 ), 
and Stack v. K earnrs, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594 (1950). 
Further, willful misconduct "involves deliberate, inten-
tional or wanton conduct in doing or omitting to do an 
act with knowledge or apprPciation that injury is likPly 
to result thPrPfrom." Stack r K Parns, s11pra. 
The PvidPnce in thf' instant casP Pstahlif.;hps that tlw 
driver involve>d had no warning. The trial court con-
elude<l that: 
"Th<> decedent did not say lw was slt>epy or 
indisposPd and nothing in his driving in thP Los 
Angeles area bPfore the trip or during the trip 
was out of the ordinary or unsaf P." (Finding 4.) 
This Finding is supported by thP tPstimony of thP app<•l-
lants. (Deposition of l\IarjoriP Brmvn, p. 17; deposition 
of Mae Brewer, pps. Hi, 38.) ThP dPcPd.Pnt "was afraid 
of driving while slf'epy," (Finding 7.) and thus "rould 
likely havf' stopped had any warning of sleep oecurrt>d. 
This Finding is supportPd by thP testimony of the dP-
ceased drivN's wife. (Df'position of Mae Brewf'r, pps. 
39-40.) Furthf'rmore, "thf' plaintiff Marjorie Brown had 
been talking to him a fc>w moments beforehand." (Find-
ing 7.) This Finding is based upon tlw testimony of the 
appellant Marjorif' Brown. (Deposition, pps. 15, 16, 17.) 
,.. 
' 
Appellants contend that they can maintain tlw bur-
den of proof in this guest case by rPliance upon the doc-
trine of rrs ipsa loq11ih1r. It is claimed that thP fact that 
thP driver apparently fell asleep was sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could draw thP inference of willful 
rniscondnrt. 
II O\\'ever, the dPcisions unanimously reject this con-
tPntion. In the rases involving res ipsa loq11itur the courts 
haw lwld, as will h<> demonstrah·d, that thP doctrine 
C'annot hP utilized \\·here a gTeat('J' degree of culpability 
than simple negligence must be shown. In cases involv-
ing iwrmissible infrrencPs from tlw faet of sleep, the 
courts unanimously ag-ree that thPre must be affirmative 
PvidPnce in addition to th(' mere fact of i;:leep in ordpr to 
JWrrnit an inferenre of more than simple nt'gligenre. 
In 79 A.L.R. 2d 6, SPc. !) at page 27, tht' author states: 
"Fnlikt' the ea:oe in which it is only neeessary 
to establish ordinary negligence, all cases seem 
to agree that the doetrim' of rPs ipso loq11it11r is 
not availablP \Yhere it is necessary, as in an action 
undPr a guest statute, to show that defendant was 
guilty of gross neglig0ncP or willful and wanton 
rniscondnrt. '' 
ln Xyl)('r/J L !( erln;, 1 ~~ P. :!d I 00() ( ?\ PV. 1948) the 
!'011 rt lH• l rJ : 
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"If the trial court's conclusion and holding, 
as a matter of law, that the plaintiff, Ruth N,vlwrg, 
was a gu<>st and not a pm:senger, was rorrect, tlwn 
it clearl,v follmYs that tlw eourt's condusion that 
tlw issue as to negligence was wlwthN pross negli-
gen<'e, rathPr than nwrely ordi11nr11 m•gligenr<>, 
had heen proven, ·was r01Tert; and, in view of tlw 
fact that plaintiffs offered no di1w·t Pvidenre of 
negligPnce, hut, in lien thf'r<>of, sought to invol;y 
tlw doctrine, rrs ipsn loq11it11r, which, as tlw rourt 
\\'Pll stated, riting ample authorit>·, is applicahl1· 
only in casPs of ordinary nf'gligf'nce, and cannot 
he invoked to f'stahlish gross negligence or willful 
misconduct, the trial court was entirel>T right in 
holding that gross nPgligPn<'P had not hPPn Pstah-
li she<l." 
Tt should hP notPd at this point that if thP dortrin(' 
of rrs ipsa loq11itur has no pla<'f' in C'asPs involving '"gros,; 
negligPnce,'' it follows with PVf'n gTPatPr forrP that it 
has no application in cases involving "willful misron-
dnet." Tn Stark r. Kearnes, supra. tlw ronrt stated: 
"\Yillful m i s c· o n <l n <· t conn ot(•s a //rent n 
wrongdoing than merr negligence or e1:r11 gross 
negligenCP. It includf's a cons<'ious or intPntional 
violation of a dPfinitP law or ml<' of condurt with 
knowledge of thP rwril to hP apprehf'nded fro.Ill 
surh art or failnn• to art." (Emphasis addPd.) 
1'hf' authoritiPs are equally O\Tern·IH-•lrning in holdinµ 
that tlwrP llHl)" hP no inferPne<' of aggravatPd n<>glig<·nC'P 
or willful miseonduet from tlw i1wrP faet of slPf'Jl. In 
l'nlentia r. 8tra11Pr. :)87 1'.:2d ..J.;)fi (X<>" . .'.\lexieo J!:)()::l). 
\\'h(•rp thne was at least some affirmative 0videnre tend-
inp: to slim\- a \\'arning of pnssihility of slPep, th<• f'onrt 
IH·ld that: 
"Th<· faC't that tlw dl'iVPl' had TIP\'(']' hPPTI to 
l1<'<l 1 h<• ]Jr<'vions night does not jm;tif~- an in-
fprprn·e that Jw fell aslP<'P and, PVPn if lw <lid, 
eonld not h<• f'Onsi<lPrPd as snffif'ient t-videnf'e of 
a statt• of mind to hring a11011t an PXCPption to th<· 
gm•st statute .... ft is apparPnt that tlws<' faf'ts, 
takPn in thr light most favorahlP to tlw app<>llant, 
an' mat1Pl'S frnm \\-hif'h it might hP dPtPnni1w<l 
that tlw driver was iwg!igent HowrvPr, it is also 
apparPnt fro111 th<• i11PrP stating of thPS<' partiC'n-
lar itPms that thel'r is no substantial PvidPnc<• of 
thP rPqni 1wl statP of mind OJ' qnalit~- of nPgli~;Pnr·<· 
n•qnin•d h~- tlw gnPst statntP.'' 
In A1ter9ntt r. Stnry, ~188 P.2d 1% C\Yyo. J91i..J), tlw 
plaintiff was injurrd \dwn thP <l<•fpndant appar<'ntl:-· fPll 
n:-;l<•Pp whilP driving. Tlw court hPld that tlw trial C'ourt 
1rns corrPl't in din•cting a verdiet for thP dPf Pndant 
sine<' th<' PvidPnce Pstahlislwd on!~- tl1at thP drivPr f Pll 
aslP<'p. Tlw f'Onrt statPd: 
"TIH' mrn• fact of falling aslPPJl whilP driving 
cloPs not constitntP nPgligPneP within thu 111<>aning 
nf tl1e statnh>." 
ThP ennrt n•quired a<lrMionnl <'Vi<lPnr<> whi<·h wonld 
-;how: 
10 
"An indifference to present legal duty and 
utter forgetfulness of legal ohligations." 
In Flynn 1'. Hurley, 124 N.E. 2d 810 (Mass. 1955), 
the court refused to allow an inference of gross negli-
gence upon the basis of evidenee whieh proved only that 
the driver fell asleep. The court held that there must he 
independent affirmative evidenee establishing the greater 
t•ulpahility inherent in tlw term "gross negligenee :" 
"In all of these cases when' it \\'as held that 
a finding of gross negligenee was warranted, then· 
was evidence of intPrmittent drowsiness or sleep. 
In other words, there was something more than 
mere falling to sleep. It is possible that sleep may 
sometimes overtake its victim unawares and we 
think it would he going too far to say that falling 
asleep without more is f'Yi<lPnee of ,gross negli-
gen<>e." 
In Turner r. Shaffer, 174 ~.K 2d G90 (Ill. 19Gl), the 
eonrt stated: 
"The almost unanimous holding in the enited 
StatP-s is that without anticipatory \Yarning, tlw 
sleepy, unconscious, or epileptic driver is not li-
able for his tortuous conduct. ... Driving while 
asleep, without more, is not negligencP although 
it is a proper basis for an inf Prence of negli-
O"ence hut as to willful and wanton misconduct 
I""> ' is not even that. ... Accordingly, WP hold that 
sleep standing alone, unheralded and unannounr-
ed, with no foreknowlf'dge or awareness by thP 
drivf'r that his eonsrionsness is hc->ing blunted or 
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proof that should have been in his mind, will not 
furnish the basis for holding that such misconduct 
is present." 
As in the cases involving res ipsa logititur, several 
of the above-cited cases which denied :my inf ere nee on 
the basis of the mere fact of sleep, were based on "gross 
negligence." Since, as previously pointed out in the quo-
tation from the Utah decision of Stack 1J. J( ea.rri f s, s11pra, 
the term ""'illful misconduct" involves a greater degree 
of culpability than gross negligPnce, it is obvious that 
an inferPncP 11'11irh cannot n'af'h the levPl of gross negli-
g-Pnce cannot he us('<l to rPach thP evPn higlwr degrPe of 
f'ulpability of \\'illful misconduct. 
A review of the cases in 28 A.L.R. 2d 12, SPcs. :J2, ..J.l, 
Pstablishes the fact that the aho.ve-cited cases r<>present 
the almost unanimous holding of all rourts. 'rherrin the 
annotator stat<>s: 
"The numerous C'ases in which courts have 
eonsidered tlw quPstion whether falling to slPep 
while 01wrating a car is in itself gross negligenr<' 
are almost unanimouslY to the effect that tlw fact 
of falling to sleep while driving is sufficient to 
Pstahlish a prima faciP case of ordinary negligence 
only hut that it is not 1-mfficient to take the case . ' 
to the jury on the question of the operator's gross 
negligPnCP. Stated differently, if plaintiff in an 
action based on gross negligence shows mHPly 
that the op0rato.r of the motor vehiele frll asleep 
while driving-, a dirPctPd wrdict for the dt'fendant 
. " is proper. 
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The appellants cite Statr v. Olsen, 108 Utah 377, lGO 
P .2d 427 ( 1945) in support of their argument that the 
mere fact of sleep is a sufficient basis for an inferencr 
that a warning preceded the sleep or that sleep alone is 
:mfficient basis for an inf Prence of willful misconduct. 
In the Olsen case, the court held that the acts of the 
defendant werP suffiriPnt to allow thf' jury to find: 
''such conduct to be negligPncP manifesting mark-
Pd disrPgard for thP saf Pt>- of others on tlw high-
"-a>·· ,, 
BvPn if it ht:> assumPd, for thP sakP- of argurnPnt, that "a 
marked disregard for the saf et>- of others" is thP Pquiv-
alent of willful misconduct,'' thP rase does not hold that 
such a state of mind may he inferred from thP mere fact 
of sleep. The various opinions in the Olsrn case show 
that thPre WPre additional farts, including thP all-import-
ant fact that the defendant bPcame drowsy bPfore tlw 
arcident, hut nevertheless rontinued to drive the truek, 
aftPr opming the windmys for a hreez<' to combat tlw 
fpeling of drowsiness. Thus, then' was affirmatiw Pvi-
dence that the driver was aware of approaching sleep, 
whfrh precludes appellants' argument that the rase was 
based upon the fact that sleep o<.'curred "-ithout any 
evidenrp of prior warning. 
The appellants cite Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 
385, 131 Atl. 432, and Collins 1:. ll!cClure, 1-t3 Ohio Rt. 
569, 56 N.E. 2d 171, as standing for the proposition that 
J3 
a warning may be inf erred from the mere fact of sleep. 
However, both cases involved simple negligence and not 
"willful misconduct" or any of the other terms that the 
appellants argue should be synonymous with willful mis-
conduct. The appellants do not go so far as to argue that 
simple negligence should be equated with willful mis-
conduct, and thus the above cases arl:' not in point. 
In the Bushnell case, tlw infnence of simple negli-
g0m·e from the fact that slf>f'P occurred was allowed be-
rausf' "thP condition of thf' mind of a pl:'rson doing harm 
iR not to bP rf'gardf'd in determining liahility within the 
proper field of the doctrinf' of negligl:'nce ... " (P. +3-1.) 
This language illustrates thf' inapplicability of such a 
rule in casf's whf're willful misconduct is involvPd. The 
statutory wording makes the state of mind vitally irn-
pmiant. Stack v. Kearnrs, supra; l1111llipa11 1·. Haru•ard, 
supra; Ricr:11ti r. Rohirison, :mzwa. 
ThB appellants haw not produced a single case 
when' a court has allowPd an inf Prence of willful mis-
conduct, or any other conduct synonomous with willful 
misconduct, from the rnf're fact of sleep, and all cases 
seem to require at least some affirmative evidence of a 
"Taming. 
'rhe appellants alternatively arg1w that this Court 
should take judicial notice of the fact that sleep is always 
preceded by a warning. It is established that a court may 
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judicially notice facts that are generally known in the 
community. Brough v. Ute Stampe.de Assn., 105 Utah 
446, 142 P.2d 670 (1943). Some courts extend the scope 
of judicial notice to scientific facts over which there is 
no substantial dispute and which may be verified with 
certainty. Sta.te v. Graham, 322 S.W. 2d 188 (Mo. 1959). 
However, the fact which the appellants contend should 
he noticed is not within eith<•r of the ahove rlasses. 
Although it is common knowledge that sleep is prP-
ceded by a gradual loss of consciousness, it is equally 
within common experience that such loss of consciousness 
doPs not always hecomP a "warning" sinre there ma~' be 
no momentary return of consciousness to a degree necPs-
sary to preceive a warning. A person undergoing a loss 
of consciousness o.f which hP is not aware doPs not haw 
the pPreeption to he warnP<l. 
Although the fact that a gradual loss of conscious-
ness always precedes sleep may hP scientifirally verifird 
with certainty, the fad that onP alu·ays lJecomes 01t1are 
of such loss of consciousnPss so as to h<> warned of ap-
proaching slPep is not capable of such wrification. Jn 
fact, thP tPstirnony of Dr. Rufus ,J arnes W alkPr, callPd 
as an expert by the a.ppPllants, Pstahlishes that sleep may 
come without "'arning-. 
ThP appellants cite the Utah case of State v. Olse11. 
108 Utah 377, 160 P.2d 427 (1945), as supporting the 
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argument that judicial notice is proper under the facts 
of this case. However, the case in no way supports the 
appellants' argument. The court there held that the jury 
could infer a warning under the facts of that case. There 
is no language in the opinion that even suggests such 
a warning may he judicially noticed. 
No suggestion has been made by appellants, either 
here or in tlw trial court, that any different or additional 
evid<:>nce "'ould be availahle on the trial ronrerning the 
material facts of this casP. 
Appellants had the burden of proving willful nns-
eonduct, in order to avoid the Guest Statute. If a jury 
\Yere to be permitt<:•d to consider the facts in this record, 
it could not find the fact essential to appellants' case -
willful misconduct - without indulging in pure specula-
tion and conjecture. It would be reciuired to srwculate 
wht>ther or not the dec<'ased driver had a prior warning 
of sleep and, if the jury speculated that he did, thPn it 
\\'ould he reciuired to conjecturt> about the nature and 
extent of that warning, \\'hethPr lw pPrreiwd its signifi-
eancP and, finally, whetlwr lw, neverthelPss, vohmtarily 
d0cided to rontimw to drivP in the fare of that warning. 
This is tlw kind of speculation and conjecture which, 
under prior decisions of this Court, may not propt>rly 
form tht> basis for a jury verclict. Alrnrndn r. Tucker 
( 195-!), 2 et ah 2d lG, 2GS P.2d. 986, and cases tlwrein 
cited. 
16 
CON CL FSION 
The appellants recognize the need for a shmving of 
prior warning of sleep in ordN for a driver to be guilty 
of willful misconduct, and finding no evidence of such 
a warning in the instant case, argue that it should be 
judicially noticed, or that willful misconduct should be 
inferred from the fact that sleep ultimately occurred, or, 
under the doctrine of res ipsa Z.Oq11it11r, inferred from tlw 
fact that the accident itself occurred. The sole basis for 
this argument is the contention that sleep is always pre-
c>eded by a warning. However, this contention, as is 
revealed by a reading of the various cited decisions, con-
flicts with common experience and with the testimony of 
the appellants' 0\\11 expert. 
No court, in an~T prior case, in any ;jurisdiction, has 
extended its decisions to the extent no-w asked of this 
Court by appellants. If this Court were to accept ap-
pellants' suggestion, it would thereby reject its mm prior 
decisions construing the term "willful misconduct" and 
would render that statutory term meaningless. 
Respectfull~T suhmittPd, 
.JOHN H. SNOW 
701 Continental Bank Bldg 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attnrne'lf for Defenda11t-
Responde11t 
